No Blood for Oil: The Case for Revoking the Carter Doctrine

By Vance Trefethen

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“Iran closes Strait of Hormuz” - Response: Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict 18

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A US foreign policy in the Middle East that began over 30 years ago during the Carter Administration has cost our nation dearly in blood and treasure ever since, in addition to making the problem worse that it was supposed to solve. Please join my partner and me as we show the comparative advantages of affirming that The United States should significantly reform its policy toward one or more countries in the Middle East.

OBSERVATION 1. Our DEFINITIONS

**Significant**: “large enough to be noticed or have an effect” *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict. 2014* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant)*)*

**Policy**: “a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body”*(Merriam-Webster Online Dict. 2014* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy?show=0&t=1402599657*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy?show=0&t=1402599657))

**Middle East** is defined in the Turkish Journal of Politics in 2011 as:

In a broad meaning, we can state that the Middle East covers a region from Ethiopia in the south, Turkey in the north, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west.

Turkish Journal of Politics Vol 2 No. 2, 2011 (Osman Nuri Özalp, Kırklareli University) “Where is the Middle East? The Definition and Classification Problem of the Middle East as a Regional Subsystem in International Relations” <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/112.pdf>

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY. The “Carter Doctrine” of military intervention in the Middle East.

**We see this in 2 FACTS:**

FACT 1. Doctrine Established. Pres. Carter committed the US to protect Persian Gulf oil in 1980, when he said:

President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, 23 Jan 1980. <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml>

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened. Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region. Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

FACT 2. Still happening. Carter’s policy continues to promote war in the region today

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2014. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) Summer 2014 NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Lessons From America's War for the Greater Middle East <http://magazine.nd.edu/news/49015/>

Neither Carter nor his advisers foresaw what awaited 10 or 20 years down the line. They were largely clueless as to what lay inside the Pandora’s box they insisted on opening. But what they and their successors in government found there prompted them to initiate a sequence of military actions, some large, some small, that deserve collective recognition as a war. That war continues down to the present day.

OBSERVATION 3. FAILURES of current policy.

FAILURE 1. Increased Instability. While the Carter Doctrine was supposed to enhance regional stability, it does the opposite.

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL 1 Apr 2010 “The Carter Doctrine at 30” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/andrew-j-bacevich/carter-doctrine-30>

The Carter Doctrine was intended to secure U.S. interests in a region of ostensibly great strategic importance. Those who have applied the Carter Doctrine have assumed that the presence of U.S. forces and the periodic application of American hard power serve to enhance regional stability. Yet the record of the past 30 years suggests just the opposite: The U. S. military presence and activities have served only to promote greater instability. Our exertions, undertaken at great cost to ourselves and others, are making things not better, but worse.

FAILURE 2. Ineffective protection. US military intervention is not an effective way to protect Middle East oil

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

This policy has done little to ensure us uninterrupted access to oil, and cost us great pain, misery, and expense. Despite the $600 billion or so we have already spent on the Iraq War (on the way to an estimated $2-$3 trillion, when all associated and follow-up costs are included), Iraq today is producing less oil today than it did when U.S. troops invaded the country six years ago. And despite the mammoth U.S. military presence in the Gulf area, Iran emerged as a major regional power amidst a rise in piracy and militant Islam. When all is said and done, conventional military force is an ineffective tool for protecting far-flung, highly vulnerable oil facilities and trade routes.

FAILURE 3. Islamic Radicals. US military presence in the region inflames anti-American Islamic radicals

Dr. Ivan Eland 2009. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; senior fellow with the Independent Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 27 Aug 2009 “Fallacies in U.S. oil policy” <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2593>

A second fallacy is that the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf increases the security of oil supplies. In fact, America is seen in that part of the world as an "infidel" -- and our military presence on Islamic soil riles radical Islamists, increasing instability. While the Saudis want the U.S. security umbrella, they understand this threat. That's why they sent most U.S. troops packing before the U.S. invaded Iraq. They want the security as long as the U.S. provides it from offshore.

OBSERVATION 4. We have a PLAN. Congress and the President will do the following:

1. The President publicly revokes the Carter Doctrine and declares the US will not intervene militarily to protect Middle East oil supplies, nor to transform the government of any Middle Eastern nation.

2. Congress cancels funding for any US military activities inconsistent with the plan.

3. Enforcement through the President and US military commanders through normal military discipline.

4. Plan takes effect 6 months after an Affirmative ballot.

5. Affirmative speeches may clarify the plan as needed.

OBSERVATION 5. The ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1. American lives saved. We stop trading the blood of American soldiers for oil

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

President Obama has promised to make a substantial investment in oil alternatives. Such efforts are expected to be a major component of his economic stimulus package and deserve strong public backing. But this is only half of the problem. To overcome what he calls the "tyranny of oil," he must also repudiate the Carter Doctrine and reject the use of military force to ensure access to Middle Eastern petroleum. Only in this way can we be certain that the Iraq War will be the last time U.S. soldiers shed their blood for oil.

ADVANTAGE 2. Better Mid East Foreign Policy. Giving peace a chance is more likely to provide a solution to foreign policy challenges in the region

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2014. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) Summer 2014 NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Lessons From America's War for the Greater Middle East <http://magazine.nd.edu/news/49015/>

The beginning of wisdom is found not in denying that the war is about religion but in acknowledging that war cannot provide an antidote to the fix we have foolishly gotten ourselves into. Does the Islamic world pose something of a problem for the United States? You bet, in all sorts of ways. But after more than three decades of trying, it’s pretty clear that the application of military power is unlikely to provide a solution. The solution, if there is one, will be found by looking beyond the military realm — which just might be the biggest lesson our experience with the War for the Greater Middle East ought to teach.

ADVANTAGE 3. Huge savings. Ending defense of Persian Gulf oil saves 27 to 73 billion dollars per year

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

We estimate that were there no oil in the Persian Gulf, then US combined peacetime and wartime defense expenditures might be reduced in the long run by roughly $27–$73 billion per year (in 2004 dollars), of which roughly $6–$25 billion annually ($0.03–$0.15 per gallon or $0.01–$0.04 per liter) is attributable to motor-vehicle use.

ADVANTAGE 4. Reduced Terrorism.

Dr. Jeffrey Miron 2010. (PhD economics, M.I.T.; teaches at Harvard University, Senior Lecturer and Director of Undergraduate Studies in Harvard's Economics Department ) “Leave Mideast, End Terrorism,” 28 Jan 2010 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/leave-mideast-end-terrorism>

Ending US interference in the Middle East is a necessary condition for reducing terrorism against the US because Islamic resentment results directly from this interference. The fact that virtually all terrorist attacks against the US since 9/11 have targeted US forces in the Middle East, rather than targets on US soil, suggests the crucial objective is getting the US to leave. Of course, terminating US intrusions in the Middle East will not eliminate antipathy to the US. Some Muslims, just like some non-Muslims, hate the US merely because it is rich and powerful. But ending US interference – which is not mild or occasional but pervasive and severe – would help achieve a significant reduction in the demand for terrorist acts against us. Numerous examples illustrate this view; terrorist attacks against Britain, for example, were concentrated historically against targets in the Middle East and India, but ceased when the British departed.

2A Evidence: Revoke Carter Doctrine

OPENING QUOTES / AFFIRMATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Carter Doctrine is the “original sin” that messed up our entire foreign policy in the Middle East. We need to repeal it

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2009. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) “These Colors Run Red “ THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/article/2009/oct/01/00018/>

To persist in Afghanistan will more likely compound the miscalculation that lies at the heart of our foreign policy: the conviction that the United States has no alternative but to use any means necessary to ensure its ostensibly vital interests throughout the Greater Middle East. The debate that we need is not about Afghanistan as such but about the original sin that eventually mired us there: the misinterpretation of Soviet behavior back in 1979 that has disfigured U.S. policy ever since. If you want a strategy worthy of the name, start by repealing the Carter Doctrine.

We have no other strategic interests in the region besides oil

Prof. David Lake 2012. (department of political science, Univ of Calif-San Diego) Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy, Mar 2012, <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeLegitimatingPowercirc.pdf>

Nonetheless, through more covert ties and the implicit dependence of many regimes in the region on the protection of the United States, Washington exerts considerable authority over the foreign security and economic policies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates, and others, now including Iraq and Afghanistan. Real security hierarchy is likely greater than these imperfect measures suggest. The gains for the United States from these hierarchies are hard to estimate but likely limited. The United States is deeply involved at present in providing regional stability, which produces, first and foremost, a secure supply of oil at moderate prices for itself and its other subordinates around the world. This appears to be the primary benefit to the United States. Other than oil security, it is difficult to see what strategic interests the United States has in the region that are not otherwise connected to the effort to create international hierarchies themselves.

INHERENCY

Definition: Carter Doctrine = US will use military force in the Persian Gulf to secure oil

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2011. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) 13 Nov 2011 “Carter Doctrine” THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WAR, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow096/abstract>?

“The Carter Doctrine is the term widely given to the US policy of ensuring western dominance of the greater Persian Gulf area and using military means if deemed necessary to ensure the unhindered export of Persian Gulf oil to international markets. This policy was first given formal expression in President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union address of January 23, 1980. In his speech, Carter indicated that the Gulf region represented an area of “great strategic importance” as the source of “two-thirds of the world's exportable oil,” and so the United States was compelled “to preserve the security of this crucial region.” In the operative passage of his speech, Carter declared: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

“Bacevich in ‘13 says Obama is ending Carter Doctrine” – Response: But in 2014 he says end is nowhere in sight

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2014. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) Summer 2014 NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Lessons From America's War for the Greater Middle East <http://magazine.nd.edu/news/49015> /

For well over 30 years now, the United States military has been intensively engaged in various quarters of the Islamic world. An end to that involvement is nowhere in sight. Tick off the countries in that region that U.S. forces in recent decades have invaded, occupied, garrisoned, bombed or raided and where American soldiers have killed or been killed. Since 1980, they include Iraq and Afghanistan, of course. But also Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Pakistan. The list goes on. To judge by various official explanations coming out of Washington, the mission of the troops dispatched to these various quarters has been to defend or deter or liberate, punishing the wicked and protecting the innocent while spreading liberal values and generally keeping Americans safe.

Bacevich in ’14: Carter Doctrine motivates ongoing US intervention in the Mid East since 1980

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2014. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) Summer 2014 NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Lessons From America's War for the Greater Middle East <http://magazine.nd.edu/news/49015/>

Since 1980, back when President Jimmy Carter promulgated the Carter Doctrine, the United States has been engaged in what we should rightfully call America’s *War for the Greater Middle East.* The premise underlying that war can be simply stated: with disorder, dysfunction and disarray in the Islamic world posing a growing threat to vital U.S. national security interests, the adroit application of hard power would enable the United States to check those tendencies and thereby preserve the American way of life. Choose whatever term you like: police, pacify, shape, control, dominate, transform. In 1980, President Carter launched the United States on a project aimed at nothing less than determining the fate and future of the peoples inhabiting the arc of nations from the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.

Protecting Persian Gulf oil flow remains US foreign policy today

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2012 (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) “Hormuz-Mania“ <http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175496/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_no_exit_in_the_persian_gulf/>

If oil lay at the root of Washington’s domineering role in the Gulf, over time that role evolved into something else: a powerful expression of America’s status as a global superpower. By becoming the military overlord of the Gulf and the self-appointed guardian of oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington said to the world: "We, and we alone, are the ones who can ensure the safety of your daily oil supply and thereby prevent global economic collapse." Indeed, when the Cold War ended -- and with it an American sense of pride and identity as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism in Europe and Asia -- protection of the flow of Persian Gulf oil became America’s greatest claim to superpowerdom, and it remains so today.

List of military actions motivated by the Carter Doctrine

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL 1 Apr 2010 “The Carter Doctrine at 30” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/andrew-j-bacevich/carter-doctrine-30>

Directly or indirectly, the Carter Doctrine provided the rationale or justification for the following episodes involving the use of force by the United States:  
- Afghanistan War I (1979-1989), the U.S.-led effort to punish the Soviet Union for occupying that country.  
- The Beirut Bombing (1983), the name by which Americans choose to remember Ronald Reagan’s intervention in Lebanon.  
- The war against Khaddafi (1981-1988), a series of inconclusive skirmishes with the Libyan dictator, culminating in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103.  
- The Tanker War (1984-1988), waged by U. S. naval forces against Iran to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.  
- Iraq War I (1990-1991), the first U. S. armed confrontation with Saddam Hussein, commonly but erroneously thought to have ended with the liberation of Kuwait.  
- The Somalia Intervention (1992-1993), abruptly terminated by the notorious Mogadishu firefight.  
- Afghanistan War II (2001-2003), launched in the wake of 9/11, but left in abeyance by the Bush administration’s decision to shift the weight of U.S. military efforts elsewhere.   
- Iraq War II (2003), the resumption of large-scale hostilities against Saddam Hussein, leading to his overthrow, but inducing chaos.   
- Iraq War III (2004-2010?), a war to pacify Iraq in the face of resistance by indigenous insurgents and Islamic radicals raised up by Iraq War II.  
- Afghanistan War III (2009 --), the conflict that Bush’s successor rediscovered, renewed, and expanded; given the deepening U.S. military involvement in Pakistan, this war might alternatively be called the AfPak War.

“Carter Doctrine was only about the Soviets in Afghanistan” – Response: It has been followed and expanded by each successive President

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL 1 Apr 2010 “The Carter Doctrine at 30” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/andrew-j-bacevich/carter-doctrine-30>

Carter’s immediate aim in January 1980 was also limited. When he declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States,” to be “repelled by any means necessary,” his primary purpose was to warn the Kremlin against entertaining any thoughts about asserting Soviet dominion over the world’s energy heartland. Yet each of Carter’s successors has reinterpreted his eponymous doctrine, broadening its scope and using it to justify ever larger ambitions. The ultimate effect has been to militarize U.S. policy across various quarters of the Islamic world.

Libya intervention in 2011 was about oil

**Analysis: Proves Obama continues Carter Doctrine**

United Press International 2011. (UPI - leading news agency) 22 Mar 2011 “Libyan war about oil, U.S. lawmaker says” (parentheses in original) <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/03/22/Libyan-war-about-oil-US-lawmaker-says/UPI-48361300801026/>

The U.N. Security Council last week passed a resolution that allowed for military intervention in Libya to protect the civilian population. U.S. Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., the former chairman of the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, told MSNBC, however, that a primary reason for intervention was oil. "We're in Libya because of oil," he said. "And I think both Japan and the nuclear technology and Libya and this dependence that we have upon imported oil have both once again highlighted the need for the United States to have a renewable energy agenda going forward." Markey earlier said U.S. President Barack Obama was right to back the Security Council resolution permitting the use of force in Libya. This, he said, was consistent with U.S. commitments to helping the people meet their political aspirations. "But it all goes back to the 5 million barrels of oil that we import from (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) on a daily basis," he told MSNBC.

“Persian Gulf intervention was about the Soviet Union, not oil” - Response: The military’s own planning documents said it was about oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

In an analysis of the external costs of oil use in transportation, the Congressional Research Service (CRS, 1992) argues that concern about oil has been but one of many reasons that the US military has cared about the Persian Gulf, and even implies that oil security is a minor concern. In this section we review and rebut the CRS’ arguments, which in some form have been made by others. First, the CRS (1992) claims that throughout the Cold War, the US military was concerned more with the Soviet threat (per se) in the Persian Gulf than with US oil interests. However, the CRS does not offer any evidence in support of this claim, which as noted above is directly refuted by statements in every Military Posture document by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1979 to 1989.

“It’s about Israel, not oil” - Response: It still goes back to oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

Next, the CRS (1992) claims that the US military also is concerned with the security of Israel. However, we see no evidence of a major military policy concern for Israel per se, independent of general concerns about oil supply security for the region, and apart from the economic and military grants that the US makes directly to Israel (and which we discuss more later). The Joint Chiefs of Staff were clear on this when they stated that:  
The United States is determined to preclude disruption or hostile control of the vital resources and to limit the spread of Soviet influence in the area. Other US interests, important in their own right but bearing heavily on the security of energy resources, include peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and increased stability throughout the region (Joint Chiefs of Staff, FY1983, p. 6, emphasis added).

“It’s about Israel”- Response: If it weren’t for oil in the region we would not care about Israel

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

On account of its oil interests in the Gulf, the US certainly does want the region to be stable, and to forestall and resolve Arab–Israeli conflicts. Thus, US military policy is not concerned significantly with the security of Israel per se, but rather with regional stability because of the region’s oil. We contend that if the Middle East had neither oil nor strategic importance, the US would not make a significant military commitment in the region solely to help protect Israel. Fuller and Lesser (1997) agree, stating that ‘‘at this point, Israel’s security, however important, does not represent an extra dimension of US Gulf Policy’’ (p. 45).

“Protecting US citizens abroad” - Response: There aren’t very many, and most of them are there for oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

Finally, the CRS suggests that another ‘‘major’’ interest is the protection of US citizens, but given the small number of tourists in the Middle East—maybe 10,000 in the oil-rich nations, out of a total of nearly 7 million US tourists abroad in the early 1990s (Bureau of the Census, 1992), this seems highly unlikely. (In addition, about 50 thousand US citizens were residents in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, but it is likely that most of them worked for oil companies or related ventures, and hence would not be there if the region were not oil-rich.)

MINOR REPAIR RESPONSES

“Negotiate more with Iran” – Response: Negotiations are already underway, and we need to wait several years to see how they work out.

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies;  served as national security assistant to Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee and as civilian assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

US policy must be firmly based on the reality that it will take years to learn whether the agreement between Iran and the 5+1 can deal with the nuclear dimension, much less lead to a broader rapprochement between Iran and its neighbors and Iran and the US and other members of the P5+1. Success will require concessions on both sides as well as a willingness by the P5+1 – and especially the US - to provide real economic and political incentives to Iran. Such efforts must be backed by US willingness to fully reinstate and strengthen sanctions if Iran does not accept and enforce a meaningful full agreement.

FAILURES

GENERAL FAILURE

Carter Doctrine has massive (and bad) impact on US foreign policy

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL 1 Apr 2010 “The Carter Doctrine at 30” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/andrew-j-bacevich/carter-doctrine-30>

To an extent that few have fully appreciated, the Carter Doctrine has had a transformative impact on U.S. national security policy. Both massive and lasting, its impact has also been almost entirely pernicious. Put simply, the sequence of events that has landed the United States in the middle of an open-ended war to determine the fate of the Greater Middle East begins here.

The Carter Doctrine has failed at every goal

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2013. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) 7 Sept 2013 “On Obama’s attack on Syria: Donohue/ Bacevich “ <http://www.juancole.com/2013/09/attack-donohue-bacevich.html>

The issue really here is whether or not an effort over the course of several decades, dating back to the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, an effort that extends over several decades to employ American power, military power, overt, covert military power exercise through proxies, an effort to use military power to somehow stabilize or fix or liberate or transform the greater Middle East hasn’t worked. “And if you think back to 1980, and just sort of tick off the number of military enterprises that we have been engaged in that part of the world, large and small, you know, Beirut, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and on and on, and ask yourself, ‘What have we got done? What have we achieved? Is the region becoming more stable? Is it becoming more Democratic? Are we enhancing America’s standing in the eyes of the people of the Islamic world?’ “The answers are, ‘No, no, and no.’

INCREASED INSTABILITY / RISK OF WAR

US military presence in Strait of Hormuz increases risks and tensions with Iran

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2012 (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) “Hormuz-Mania“ <http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175496/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_no_exit_in_the_persian_gulf/>

So oil, the prestige of global dominance, Iran's urge to be a regional power, and domestic political factors are all converging in a combustible mix to make the Strait of Hormuz the most dangerous place on the planet. For both Tehran and Washington, events seem to be moving inexorably toward a situation in which mistakes and miscalculations could become inevitable. Neither side can appear to give ground without losing prestige and possibly even their jobs. In other words, an existential test of wills is now under way over geopolitical dominance in a critical part of the globe, and on both sides there seem to be ever fewer doors marked “EXIT.”

Carter Doctrine risks one war after another in the Persian Gulf region

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

So long as the United States adheres to a policy that legitimates the use of military force to protect the flow of oil, we run the risk of involvement in one war after another in the ever-volatile Persian Gulf region. True, other issues and objectives have been associated with these wars, but the underlying strategic premise for every U.S. intervention in the Gulf since 1980 has been the core concept of the Carter Doctrine: to disallow a hostile power from gaining control of the region and blocking our access to its oil.

COST

Gulf War I + Gulf War II cost $1 Trillion for Persian Gulf oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

Thus, the total cost of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War is expected to be on the order of a trillion dollars, including rough estimates of the costs of reconstruction in Iraq, but excluding the cost of the war in Afghanistan on the grounds that it is not related to the Persian Gulf or oil. If such a sequence of wars is assumed to occur every 50 years, then the annual expected cost is approximately $20 billion per year. Based on this, we assume a range of $15–$25 billion per year, in current dollars for any year.

“We’re intervening for other reasons besides oil” - Response: Cost of other interests is only a minor fraction

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

We argue here that the major ongoing US interest in the Persian Gulf is to protect oil supplies, and hence that the cost of defending interests other than oil is a minor fraction of the total cost of defending the Persian Gulf. The reason for this is straightforward: oil is the major source of energy for every industrialized economy in the world, and as a result, the price and quantity of oil in the world market directly affect economic output.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

Carter Doctrine is radical and dangerous. We should repudiate it and stop military intervention

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at [Hampshire College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hampshire_College)) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, (brackets in original) <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

Twenty-nine years ago, President Jimmy Carter adopted the radical and dangerous policy of using military force to ensure U.S. access to Middle Eastern oil. “Let our position be absolutely he clear,” he [said](http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml" \t "_blank" \o "said) in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980. “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [and thereby endanger the flow of oil] will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” This principle — known ever since as the Carter Doctrine — led to U.S. involvement in three major wars and now risks further military entanglement in the greater Gulf area. It’s time to repudiate this doctrine and satisfy U.S. energy needs without reliance on military intervention.

Protecting Persian Gulf oil is far less necessary today than it ever was

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

The world today is awash in oil and natural gas. Protecting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to global markets is far less necessary than it once was. Over the past generation, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the other oil producers in the region have grown accustomed to bloated national budgets and expensive state-run, cradle-to-grave welfare services, which means that there is greater pressure on them to sell oil than to horde it.

None of the reasons used to justify intervention for oil are valid

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

Indeed, much of the war-fighting of the last two decades has been rationalized as necessary to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and their oil, from neighborhood threats. The economic logic that has underpinned all this is based mostly on an assumption that oil is a scarce resource, that there is a tight gap between supply and demand, that ensuring supply is essential to stabilize prices and to protect the global economy from potentially devastating disruptions. None of that is really true. For most of the 20th century, oil companies and oil producing states regularly collaborated to regulate supply in order to limit competition and control prices. There never has been a global oil market. Instead, oil's production and delivery has been managed by a small network of corporate and national energy elites, whose primary concern has been serving their own interests and maintaining their bottom line.

Carter Doctrine led to 3 major wars - we need to repudiate it

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

This principle — known ever since as the Carter Doctrine — led to U.S. involvement in three major wars and now risks further military entanglement in the greater Gulf area. It's time to repudiate this doctrine and satisfy U.S. energy needs without reliance on military intervention.

Dept. of Defense estimates of cost of US military oil protection are too low: Eliminating Persian Gulf oil intervention would result in major military cost savings

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165> (brackets added)

The detailed estimates of Ravenal (1991) and Kaufmann and Steinbruner (1991) are likely to be more accurate than the DoDs (GAO, 1991), although we do accept that a small fraction of DoD [Department of Defense] overhead costs would not be significantly affected if the Persian Gulf mission were eliminated. We believe that in the long run, nearly all defense costs are variable and that Congress would recognize this through base closures, reductions in personnel, scaling back operations, and reduced expenditures on material, equipment, and major weapons systems. This sort of restructuring happens frequently, and hence it is not unreasonable to expect that there would be major cost savings were a major military objective, such as protecting the Persian Gulf, eliminated.

Congress would eliminate defense spending related to the Persian Gulf if oil were not a factor

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

If, as we have argued, the main concern of the US military in the Persian Gulf is to protect oil supplies, and if, as we also have argued, most military resources vary as a function of the number and extent of threats, then it follows that if there were no oil in the Persian Gulf, Congress eventually would eliminate most of the defense spending related to the Persian Gulf. (It would not eliminate all Persian Gulf defense spending because of non-oil interests in the Gulf and because of the fixed costs that are incurred if there is any regional defense at all, regardless of its size, scope, and purpose.)

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Iran threatens Saudis / Gulf States” - Response: Iran is no threat to them

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past.

“Iran nukes!” - Even US government admits Iran is not building nuclear weapons.

Pepe Escobar 2012. (journalist) 27 July 2012 “Why Iran sanctions are doomed to fail” CBS NEWS <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-iran-sanctions-are-doomed-to-fail/>

Let's start with red lines. Here it is, Washington's ultimate red line, [straight from](http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcript-january-8-2012" \t "_blank) the lion's mouth.  Only last week Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said of the Iranians, "Are they trying to develop a nuclear weapon? No. But we know that they're trying to develop a nuclear capability. And that's what concerns us. And our red line to Iran is do not develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us." How strange, the way those red lines continue to retreat.  Once upon a time, the red line for Washington was "enrichment" of uranium. Now, it's evidently an actual nuclear weapon that can be brandished. Keep in mind that, since 2005, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has [stressed](http://www.juancole.com/2009/10/iran-and-nuclear-latency.html" \t "_blank) that his country is not seeking to build a nuclear weapon. The most recent [National Intelligence Estimate](http://blogs.mcclatchydc.com/nationalsecurity/2011/02/new-nie-on-iran-nuke-program-appears-to-differ-little-from-2007-findings.html" \t "_blank) on Iran from the U.S. Intelligence Community has similarly stressed that Iran is not, in fact, developing a nuclear weapon (as opposed to the breakout capacity to build one someday).

“Iran Threat” – Response: Iran is no threat

Micah Zenko & Michael Cohen 2012. (Zenko - Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Affairs. Cohen – Fellow at the Century Foundation ) Clear and Present Safety, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Mar/Apr 2012 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety>

It is a matter of faith among many American politicians that Iran is the greatest danger now facing the country. But if that is true, then the United States can breathe easy: Iran is a weak military power. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s “military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future.”

“Iran will do bad things” - Response: Turn – US military presence is what’s fueling Iranian confrontation

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control.

“Iran Nuclear Threat” – Response: Iran will be deterred. There’s no threat to the US homeland

Micah Zenko & Michael Cohen 2012. (Zenko - Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Affairs. Cohen – Fellow at the Century Foundation ) Clear and Present Safety, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Mar/Apr 2012 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety>

Of course, the gravest concerns about Iran focus on its nuclear activities. Those fears have led to some of the most egregiously alarmist rhetoric: at a Republican national security debate in November, Romney claimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon is “the greatest threat the world faces.” But it remains unclear whether Tehran has even decided to pursue a bomb or has merely decided to develop a turnkey capability. Either way, Iran’s leaders have been sufficiently warned that the United States would respond with overwhelming force to the use or transfer of nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear Iran would be troubling to the region, the United States and its allies would be able to contain Tehran and deter its aggression -- and the threat to the U.S. homeland would continue to be minimal.

No Impact: Oil prices have very small effect on the economy

Dr. Lutz Kilian 2009. (Ph.D. in Economics; prof. of economics at Univ of Michigan) Oil Price Volatility: Origins and Effects, December 1, 2009 <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201002_e.pdf>

The second problem is that, to the extent that oil prices affect domestic output, under standard assumptions their impact should be bounded by the cost share of oil in domestic production, which is known to be very small. For example, for the United States, the ratio of imported and domestically produced crude oil in GDP has been fluctuating between 1 and 5 percent (see Edelstein and Kilian 2007). Thus, if oil price shocks are viewed as cost shocks for the oil-importing economy, their effect by construction cannot be very large. Indeed, Backus and Crucini (2000) have demonstrated that standard production-based general equilibrium models of the transmission of oil price shocks are not capable of explaining large fluctuations in real GDP. This type of result came as a surprise to many researchers who expected oil price shocks to be a major determinant of the business cycle.

“Higher oil prices from lack of military security in the Persian Gulf” - Response: Oil producing nations would make other security arrangements. US protection has little effect on oil prices

Jerry Taylor 2007. (served on several congressional advisory bodies and has testified frequently on Capitol Hill regarding various energy and environmental policy matters; adjunct scholar at the Institute for Energy Research) “Ask the Expert: Does Interventionism Cause Cheap Oil?” <http://mgt571t.wikispaces.com/share/view/55687554>

I suspect that a cessation of U.S. security assistance would be replaced by security expenditures from other parties. First, oil producers will provide for their own security needs as long as the cost of doing so results in greater profits than equivalent investments could yield. Because Middle Eastern governments typically have nothing of value to trade except oil, they must secure and sell oil to remain viable. Second, given that their economies are so heavily dependent on oil revenues, Middle Eastern governments have even more incentive than we do to worry about the security of production facilities, ports, and sea lanes. Third, even if producing countries were to provide inadequate security in the eyes of consuming countries, consuming countries could pay producers to augment it. In short, whatever security our presence provides (and many analysts think that our presence actually reduces security) could be provided by other parties were the United States to withdraw. The fact that the Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid for 55 percent of the cost of Operation Desert Storm suggests that keeping the Straits of Hormuz free of trouble is certainly within their means. The same argument applies to al Qaeda threats to oil production facilities. Thus, U.S. Persian Gulf expenditures should not be viewed as a subsidy that lowers oil prices below what they otherwise would be. Instead, the expenditures are a taxpayer financed gift to oil regimes that have little, if any, effect on oil prices.

US is not the principal importer of Persian Gulf oil, nor is any Mid-East country the principal source for US oil imports.

**Dr John Alterman, who advocates US intervention in the Middle East, nevertheless admits in 2011:**

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

In this regard, what many in the Gulf are watching closely are signs of diminished U.S. commitment to provide free passage of energy resources out of the region. U.S. economic ties to the Gulf have always been secondary to security concerns. The United States is not the principal oil export market for any country in the region, nor is any Middle Eastern country the principal source for U.S. imported oil. In fact, Saudi exports to the United States have flattened, and China is now the principal destination for Saudi oil.

“US protects oil for other consuming nations” - Response: Other nations’ oil consumption is irrelevant to US policy

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

Should some of the US military cost be allocated to oil consumption and production by other nations, on the grounds that these other nations benefit from US military expenditures? The answer is an unambiguous ‘‘no’’. These other nations are free riders, and whenever there are free riders the incidence of benefits does not correspond to the incidence of costs. In an economic cost or cost-benefit analysis, the relevant question always focuses on opportunity cost, on the counterfactual: if the US did not have oil interests in the Persian Gulf, and in fact was completely insulated from any worldwide recessions traceable to any country’s use of Persian Gulf oil, it certainly would not spend money (without reimbursement or reciprocation) to protect oil in the Persian Gulf. US expenditures are motivated entirely by US interests, broadly defined, and the presence of free riders does not change this.

“Abandoning Israel” - Response: US can still support Israel without military presence and operations in Middle East. Costs of supporting Israel are not included in cost of oil protection

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165> (brackets added)

Note that we are not arguing that the US does not have any interest in the security Israel; rather, we are arguing that the US military policy towards the Middle East is not predicated ultimately on the security of Israel. Indeed, as we discuss later, the US does give Israel military and economic grant aid (the cost of which is separate from the US DoD [Dept of Defense] costs estimated here). Thus, whatever interest the US has in the security of Israel it expresses mainly by giving Israel military and economic aid rather than by devoting more resources to the US military presence and operation in the Middle East.

“Cutting defense spending hurts the economy” - Response: No link between defense spending and economy

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/publication-detail/?pub_id=1165>

One might ask whether military spending affects economic growth, and hence has social benefits or costs in addition to the direct expenditures. One could argue, for example, that technological spin-offs of military research and development become a positive externality in the private sector and contribute to economic growth. On the other hand, one could argue that defense spending takes money from more productive uses. As it turns out, most studies have found either no link between defense spending and economic growth, or else weak and ambiguous links.

“Iran will block the Strait of Hormuz” - Response: Economic suicide - they would be wrecking their own economy

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Jan 2012 “Con: U.S. bombing unnecessary because Iran lacks the resources to block the strait” GAZETTE XTRA <http://gazettextra.com/news/2012/jan/26/con-us-bombing-unnecessary-because-iran-lacks-reso/>

Besides, closing the Strait would be economic suicide for the Iranian regime, which has been teetering politically since its fraudulent 2009 election. Such an action would indeed fulfill the West’s goal of stanching Iran’s oil exports, but it would also cut off vital imports, including refined petroleum products. Even during Iran’s radical revolution in the late 1970s and its bitter war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988—which involved the belligerents attacking oil tankers and facilities and a large battle between the Iranian and U.S. navies—Iran did not try to totally block this chokepoint. Thus, Iran’s threat is likely just an attempt to increase the world oil price to nullify any effects of sanctions.

“Strait of Hormuz closure” - Response: Unlikely. Even if it did, alternative routes exist and US military isn’t needed

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Jan 2012 “Con: U.S. bombing unnecessary because Iran lacks the resources to block the strait” GAZETTE XTRA <http://gazettextra.com/news/2012/jan/26/con-us-bombing-unnecessary-because-iran-lacks-reso/>

U.S. Navy war games have shown that closing the Strait for any length of time would be highly unlikely. Even if oil flow through the Strait was reduced, more oil could be transferred from the Persian Gulf using the underutilized land pipeline across Saudi Arabia to its port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. History shows that developed economies, such as that of the United States, are fairly resilient to petroleum price increases that reduced oil flow might bring. Thus, there is no reason for the United States to use military force to keep the Strait open.

“Iran closes Strait of Hormuz” - Response:  Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict

Lt. Gen. Ron Burgess 2012. quoted by  Voice of America  (US Army general, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency) 156 Feb 2012 quoting from his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, US: Iran Unlikely to Initiate Conflict in Nuclear Dispute, <http://www.voanews.com/content/us-dismisses-iranian-nuclear-advancement-claims-as-hype-139427953/152115.html>

"Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz at least temporarily, and may launch missiles against United States forces and our allies in the region if it is attacked.  Iran could also attempt to employ terrorist surrogates worldwide," said Burgess. "However, the agency assesses Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict."

“Iran closes Strait of Hormuz” - Response: Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict

Lt. Gen. Ron Burgess 2012. (US Army general, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency) 16 Feb 2012 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, <http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16b.html>

Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz, at least temporarily and may launch missiles against United States forces and our allies in the region if it is attacked. Iran could also attempt to employ terrorists surrogates worldwide. However, the agency assesses Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict.

**“Iran mines the Strait of Hormuz” - Response: Not easy to do, and Saudi Arabia could stop them**

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy, Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Jan 2012 “Con: U.S. bombing unnecessary because Iran lacks the resources to block the strait” GAZETTE XTRA <http://gazettextra.com/news/2012/jan/26/con-us-bombing-unnecessary-because-iran-lacks-reso/>

Mining the Strait would be difficult as well, requiring a large number of Iran’s primitive mines to completely close the waterway. Capable regional air forces, such as Saudi Arabia’s, could prevent that by sinking Iranian tankers and mine-layers without any need for direct U.S. involvement.

“Oil Price Shocks if a war breaks out” - Response: Doesn’t justify US military protection. Developed economies are resistant to oil shocks.

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 29 Feb 2012 “Energy Protectionism Is Not Good Policy,” <http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2012/02/28/energy-protectionism-is-not-good-policy/>

Protectionism and neo-mercantilism, the government subsidization of certain private businesses at the expense of consumers, are as inefficient in energy as they are in other products and commodities. One hidden subsidy for American oil companies and overseas oil-producing countries that my book exposes are the hundreds of billions of dollars spent “defending” U.S. oil interests abroad. Even if wars in the Middle East occur, oil is a valuable commodity, and exporting it generates handsome profits. Thus, oil is often exported around and sometimes, as in the example of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, through wars. Guarding against the rare oil-supply disruption by stationing vast American military forces, whose expenses are not contingent, in the Middle East and other places is unnecessary to prevent oil price shocks to developed economies that have proven resistant to them.

**“Oil Price Shocks if a war breaks out in the Middle East” - Turn: US intervention drives up oil prices**

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 29 Feb 2012 “Energy Protectionism Is Not Good Policy,” <http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2012/02/28/energy-protectionism-is-not-good-policy/>

Even oil protectionists and neo-mercantilists, such as Friedman, apparently don’t put much credence in the theory that high oil prices damage developed economies. In fact, they usually support wars in the Middle East and economic sanctions on oil-producing nations — for example, against Saddam’s Iraq and currently against Iran — that artificially drive oil prices up.

“Lost US influence in the Gulf” - Response: We would have better influence without military protection

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389>

The Gulf states are wealthy and resource rich, but they are beholden to the free movement of labor, capital, and oil. Once oil has to flow in a free market, rather than in one controlled by producers who operate under Western military protection, they will be subject to a range of "normal" kinds of political and economic leverage. Using these sources of leverage would prove less problematic for an America that is struggling with the gap between its interests and values in the less-than-democratic Gulf.

“SAUDIS GET NUKES DISAD RESPONSES”

**Affirmative has to decide whether they want to go with a non-uniqueness response (“Saudis will get them anyway in Status Quo”) or a no-link response (“Saudis can’t build a nuke, so the impact never happens”). But you can’t really run both at the same time.**

“Nuclear arms race - Saudis get nukes if we don’t protect them” - Response: They are deciding not to rely on outside protection and will get nukes anyway if Iran does

ASSOCIATED PRESS 2011. “Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race” 6 Dec 2011<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-may-seek-nuclear-weapons-prince-says.html>

A Saudi prince, in a remark designed to send chills through the Obama administration and its allies, suggested that the kingdom might consider producing nuclear weapons if it found itself between atomic arsenals in Iran and Israel. The prince, Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United States, made the comment on Monday at a Persian Gulf security forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The remark confirmed Western fears about the potential for an arms race in the Middle East if Iran moves to produce a nuclear weapon. But it also reflected the hardening views among the Persian Gulf’s Arab states that they must rely on themselves — and not just on Western protection — as tensions with Iran grow worse.

“Saudis get nuclear weapons” - Response: They don’t have the capacity to build nukes

Steven A. Cook 2012. (Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) Apr 2012 [Don't Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race) , FOREIGN POLICY <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race>

What about Saudi Arabia, then, the Sunni power that is on the tip of most analysts' tongues when it comes to Shiite Iran getting the bomb? Saudi Arabia has the cash to make large-scale investments in nuclear technology. Indeed, the only factor that makes warnings about Saudi proliferation -- such as that delivered by former Ambassador the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal last year -- even remotely credible is the resources the Saudis can muster to buy a nuclear program. Yet, while Riyadh can outfit itself with nuclear facilities with ease, it does not have the capacity to manage them. Mohamed Khilewi, a former Saudi diplomat, claims that the kingdom has been developing a nuclear arsenal to counter Israel since the mid-1970s -- but he offers no substantiated evidence to support these claims. In fact, the country has no nuclear facilities and no scientific infrastructure to support them**.** It's possible that Saudi Arabia could import Pakistanis to do the work for them. But while Saudis feel comfortable with Pakistanis piloting some of their warplanes and joining their ground forces, setting up a nuclear program subcontracted with Pakistani know-how -- or even acquiring a nuclear device directly from Islamabad -- poses a range of political risks for the House of Saud.

Saudi claims about nuclear weapons are just empty posturing - they shouldn’t be taken seriously

Steven A. Cook 2012. (Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) Apr 2012 [Don't Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race) , FOREIGN POLICY <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race>

The concern about Saudi proliferation stems from fears that the kingdom would be forced to act if both Iran and Israel possessed a nuclear arsenal. "We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don't," an unnamed Saudi official declared to the *Guardian* on the sidelines of a meeting between Prince Turki al Faisal and NATO officialsin June 2011. "It's as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit." Yet given the fact that the Saudis have very little nuclear infrastructure to speak of, this kind of statement is little more than posturing designed to force the U.S. hand on Iran. Unlike similar warnings by Israel, which has the capacity to follow through on its threat to attack Iran's nuclear sites, Riyadh's rhetoric about acquiring nuclear weapons is empty. What is amazing is how many people take the Saudis seriously.